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RESOLVING DOCTOR-PATIENT CONFLICTS
Bernard L. .Diamond*

TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTORPATIENT RELATIONS. By Robert A. Burt. New York: The Free
Press. 1979. Pp. vii, 200. $15.95.
Professor Burt of the Yale Law School has written a book that is
concerned with a single problem, and he proposes a specific solution
to that problem. This narrow theme makes the book very difficult to
review fairly. If one agrees with the proposed solution, one may
overvalue the book and not perceive whether the author reaches that
solution through sound reasoning. If one disagrees with the author's
conclusions, one may lose objectivity and overlook the broader implications of the analysis that precedes the conclusion.
I disagree with most of Professor Burt's analysis of the problem
and I strongly disagree with his proposed solution. This disagreement is despite my feelings of harmony with Professor Burt's interest
and approach toward a difficult subject. Burt is a legal scholar who
has a very considerable knowledge of psychoanalytic theory. I am a
psychoanalyst who has some knowledge of legal theory, so we share
much intellectual territory. Perhaps that is why we don't agree. Or
is it because the medical mind and the legal mind can never agree,
no matter how much they share?
The_ problem posed by the author is a profound one: Who has, or
should have, the power to make critical decisions in the doctor-patient relationship? Does the doctor know best? Perhaps doctors
should make all final decisions. Does the patient's right of self-determination override all other considerations? Perhaps we should
never tolerate anything short of fully informed consent by the patient. Or should the law intervene in certain difficult situations,
making a judge decide what is to be done?
Burt introduces the problem by vividly describing two cases. The
first is that of a young man who is horribly mutilated and blinded by
an automobile fire and explosion. His treatment is slow, excruciatingly painful and he will never be restored to a normal condition.
The other case is that of an elderly woman who was confined in a
mental hospital because of her tendency to wander about the streets.
Her case is well known, for she is the subject of a leading. "least
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restrictive alternative" appellate decision. 1 Burt uses these two cases
to develop "the proposition that assigning exclusive choice-making
authority in one party (whether patient, physician, or judge) and
complementary choiceless status to another in an interpersonal
transaction readily leads to paradoxically destructive results for all
participants" (p. 134). For reasons I will develop below, I am impelled to reply, "Not necessarily!"
Relying almost entirely upon psychoanalytic theories concerning
unconscious motives, attitudes and feelings, the author pursues his
theme with vigor and consistency. He states:
Whose claim of benevolence toward diseased people is to be believed? That is the underlying question of this work. My answer can
be quickly summarized: no one's claim should be wholly believed or
disbelieved, whether the claimant is physician or law reformer, judge
or the diseased person himself. Rules governing doctor-patient relations must rest on the premise that anyone's wish to help a desperately
pained, apparently helpless person is intertwined with a wish to hurt
that person, to obliterate him from sight. It is not accidental that the
injunction to "take care of'' someone has a two-edged meaning in popular speech [p. vi].
·
To mitigate the dangers of unconscious ambivalence and destructive aggressive impulses, Burt proposes that all consent between doctor and patient, for treatment of both physical and mental
conditions, be reached only by what he calls "conversation" between
them. By "conversation," he really seems to mean a psychotherapeutic interchange, as prolonged as necessary, to resolve completely
all unconscious ambivalence, in both the patient and the physician.
If such conversation does not spontaneously resolve all ambivalence,
Burt would allow no appeal to the law to make the decision, for the
judge, who necessarily suffers from the same ambivalence, will inflict
his own brand of unconscious aggression upon the patient and doctor.
The law cannot interrupt this dynamic by purporting to take control of relations between doctor and patient. It can only hope to accomplish this by refusing to take control, by forcing both doctors and
patients to acknowledge that neither has unquestioned power over the
other in order to prod both toward confronting the ultimate reality that
neither has unquestioned power over the issues of disease, mortality,
and dis-eased [sic] thinking that have brought them into relation. The
law will only fuel rather than interrupt this destructive dynamic by
providing a mechanism for advance review, for declaratory judgments,
to decide all specific treatment issues in dispute between patients and
physicians [p. 137].
Thus, Burt would use the authority of the court not to make a
decision, but rather to force doctor and patient into "conversation."
I. See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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Essential to Professor Burt's proposal is the element of uncertainty.
The physician must know in advance the penalty for violating his
patient's expressed wishes. Such penalty may be stringent or it may
only be symbolic, but
[t]he principle should remain clear that physicians are obliged to ob- .
tain patients' consent in all matters; thus motivation will be established
for conversation, for negotiation. But by keeping uncertain the precise
consequences of any breach of this principle, the law establishes the
motives for intense negotiation, for sustained face-to-face conversation
in which each party feels himself personally engaged because each believes in the unavoidability of his own pain and the other's power to
inflict pain on him [p. 140].

If the patient and doctor fail to resolve their conflict, the legal system

should tread lightly.
By promising that some subsequent judicial review of the doctor-patient conversation is available, but by withholding that review until the
immediate participants have acted on their own disputed or agreed
conclusions from that conversation, the law gives both participants a
concrete demonstration that their conversation has an interminable,
and comfortingly indestructable, dimension [p. 138].

Burt's judicial review will not produce a decision as to the correct
action in giving or withholding the treatment. Rather, it will only
review the adequacy of the conversation, assessing whether the conversation has ended properly or should be carried further. If the
physician has acted improperly after an inadequate conversation
with the patient, the court will impose a punishment that is appropriate to the wrongdoing but that the physician could not have accurately foretold. The goal is to avoid shifting the responsibility for
decision upon the law, and instead to use the authority of the law to
force upon the doctor and patient as extensive a negotiation conversation (therapy?) as is necessary.
The final chapter discusses the issues raised by what the author
terms "silent patients." These are patients who, because of severe
mental illness, incapacity, or unconsciousness, are unable to engage
in the conversation required for informed consent. Here, two other
cases are introduced and their dilemmas analyzed: Karen Quinlan
and the less well-known Saikewicz. Saikewicz was a sixty-six yearold man, severely mentally retarded, incapable of any meaningful
verbal communication, who suffered from a fatal leukemia. People
with such leukemia are normally given chemotherapy, which prolongs their lives but does not cure the disease. The treatment requires cooperation from the patient, and it is often painful and
distressing. Saikewicz's doctors petitioned a Massachusetts court to
decide whether they should withhold chemotherapy because of his
inability to consent, to cooperate, or to understand the reason for the
suffering he might undergo as a result of the treatment. The court
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authorized withholding chemotherapy, and Saikewicz soon died (p.
145).
For the complex problems aroused by such silent patients, the
author prescribes the same conversational remedy, but in more complex form. Neither physician, relative, friend, nor judge must speak
for the patient. Especially, no one must presume to assert what the
patient, if he could speak and understand, might desire. The solution must still be a conversation but of such extent that all who could
possibly have any involvement or interest must participate. Because
the physician and family are granted no advance legal immunity,
[t]hese actors could withhold treatment and minimize these risks [of
criminal prosecution] only by the most intense collaboration with one
another, and with intense individualized attention to the uncommunicative patient, in order to build a defensible record that every treatment effort has been made and that the futility and painfulness of these
efforts appeared so palpable to so many different people involved in
the decision that all were prepared to take the risk of prosecution for
criminal conspiracy rather than continue heartless compliance with the
apparent letter of the law [p. 166].

Burt does not explain how to select the "many different people
involved in the decision." In some situations, one might anticipate
great difficulty in getting anyone involved. In other situations, all
sorts of persons might claim involvement and decisional rights to
which they are not entitled. One can foresee endless difficulties.
Throughout the book, the author is annoyingly vague about how his
proposed procedures should be implemented.
Many of the inferences and psychoanalytic interpretations that
Burt presents as established facts could be disputed: he gives no
credit to alternative interpretations of psychological phenomena.
His basic writing style expresses an unjustified attitude of certainty,
conviction, and enthusiasm. If perceived as a highly speculative,
somewhat one-sided, proposal for the solution of very difficult
medico-legal problems based upon disputable psychoanalytic interpretations of .unconscious motivation, Taking Care of Strangers is a
fascinating and instructive book. But if considered as a practical and
realistic proposal to cope with existing conflicts of medical informed
consent, its usefulness is questionable. I fear the author had the latter rather than the former mission.
Rather than go through the volume and nit-pick about all the
points where I would prefer a different interpretation from Professor
Burt's, I will limit myself to discussing a few of the broad and mistaken assumptions that, in my opinion, pervade the entire book. A
relevant (apocryphal?) anecdote is told about Sigmund Freud.
Freud was an inveterate cigar smoker, and one day a friend asked
him, "Doctor Freud, how is it possible that you, who discovered that
cigars and similar objects are actually phallic symbols, go around all
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day with a penis in your mouth?" Freud replied, ''Yes, it is true that
a cigar is a penis symbol. But do not forget that a good cigar is also a
good cigar."
By concentrating on the unconscious dynamics of the participants in the medical-legal-patient relationship and neglecting their
conscious and intentional motivations, the author is misled into impractical and perhaps erroneous conclusions. Much of what he says
concerning the unconscious destructive dynamics of doctor, patient,
and judge may well be true. But it is not the whole story. The unconscious is an important determinant of human behavior, but it is
not the sole determinant. Burt seems to give no credence to the possibility that experience, knowledge and insight might confer sufficient power over one's destructive drives to permit rational actions
and relationships, even without prolonged conversations. Professor
Burt derives his hypotheses and his solutions from extraordinary and
exceptional cases. They well fit what Judge David Bazelon of the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals calls "chamber of
horrors cases." Laws and procedures based on such horror cases are
not likely to be good. They are the hard cases that can make bad
law. It may be that such cases evoke the malicious power of the
unconscious. But the rules that govern the millions of everyday interactions of doctors and patients must be responsive to the conscious egos, and give credibility to the will and intent of the
participants. Burt seems to have overlooked the fact that ambivalent
feelings do not necessarily give rise to ambivalent decisions and actions. To the contrary, I think that in most ordinary interpersonal
situations, one side of the ambivalence is suppressed, for good or bad
reasons, and the resultant action is unambivalent. Thus both patient
and physician may suppress their mutual hostility and interact with
trust and confidence. In the vast majority of simple, direct interchanges between doctor and patient (or between any two persons),
it may be best, as Freud says, to pay attention to the cigars and leave
the phallic symbols to the psychoanalytic couch.
Thus, I believe, for most surgical and medical procedures, patients can give rational, informed consent in an atmosphere of trust,
and the physician can suppress any sadistic motivations and respond
to the patients' needs. However, I do agree with Burt that in special
cases and special circumstances, this is not likely to be true. These
include the chamber of horrors cases of pain, mutilation, and disability2 as well as the cases of uncooperative incompetent patients
2. I am very familiar with the monstrous problems associated with such tragedies. During
World War II, I had the major responsibility during one year of attempting to cope with the
emotional problems of hundreds of blinded soldiers. In addition to their blindness, most of
them had severe head injuries, and many had one or more mutilated arms or legs. See Diamond & Ross, Emotional Adjustment of Newly Blinded Soldiers, 102 AM. J. OF PSYCH. 367
(1945).
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who are involuntarily confined and treated. For some such cases,
Burt's extended and extensive conversations motivated by the threat
of judicial review may work. But for many of these exceptional
prob_lems it cannot be assumed that there is a rational, correct solution. Unfortunately, we cannot assume that every human problem
has a proper answer. Sometimes every possible response to a problem will have significant detrimental consequences. Yet to take no
action may be much more detrimental. Sometimes the knowledge
required for a rational decision does not exist and will not magically
appear, no matter how extensive and protracted the conversations
between the participants. And in many cases an incorrect decision is
better than no decision.
These are the human problems where the issue is not, "Who
knows the right answer?" Rather, it is, ''Who is accepted by society
and the participants as having the authority to prescribe an answer?"
Such authority may not necessarily be founded upon superior
knowledge or special insights into the human condition. Nor is the
responsibility inherent in that authority necessarily a quality- of the
decision maker. It may well be simply attributed to him by social
institutions or customs. Nevertheless, a sort of consensus cloaks the
decision with an aura of wisdom and power, action is taken, and
everyone can then go about their daily business. Certainly it is possible to demonstrate that the need for such authorities has its roots in
the unconscious need for the omnipotent and omniscient father of
infancy. But the decision is also a decision that needs to be made,
roots or no roots.
Different cultures at different times have used a variety of persons to decide impossible problems. In our society, I believe, judges
are admirably suited for this role. They are designated by society as
authority figures; their decisions are translated into action. They are
surrounded with sufficient mystique and symbols of wisdom and
fairness that their decisions can be respected by all concerned. Behind them is the Law, supposedly the distillation of the moral wisdom of the ages. That all this may be illusory is beside the point.
Some ill~sions are worth retaining. When there is no right answer,
when there is no existing wisdom to determine the correct response,
when the truth is elusive, yet action must be taken, judges seem to do
quite well (unless they suffer from excessive scrupulousness or blind
arrogance). When there has been a breakdown in the normal communication between doctor and patient, or when, as with "silent patients," communication is impossible, Professor Burt would have us
avoid the one decision maker in our society peculiarly suited to the
task - the judge. Rather than limit his authority, I would extend it.
I would reinforce his decisional respectability by establishing, insofar as possible, guidelines Oaws?) and precedents that take some of
the burden off his shoulders.
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I know only too well from my experience as a forensic psychiatrist that judges are not always wise, rational, free from prejudice, or
responsible in their decisions. Sometimes I have thought that others
would have made better decisions, or that I, personally, could have
done better. But neither I nor the others possessed the necessary authority and social ascription of power and respectability to have our
decisions accepted. Some judges never make any decisions, let alone
difficult or impossible decisions. They pass the problem on to someone else, or they procrastinate, or they rubber-stamp, or they blindly
follow what they believe to be precedent. They may do exactly as
Burt says - wreak havoc by inflicting their own unconscious aggression on others. But I have more faith than Professor Burt that the
law and its representatives, the judges, are the proper instruments for
resolving conflict and dispute and for making decisions in all those
human situations where no one else has the proper combination of
knowledge, experience, wisdom, power, authority, and respectability
to do as well.

